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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the public protests now known as the “Umbrella Revolution”, many 
Hongkongers struggle to renegotiate what it means to be “Chinese”. Previous agreements 
about universal suffrage and political autonomy in Hong Kong, as outlined in the “One 
Country, Two System”-policy, now appear like broken promises. This thesis asks the question 
whether the Umbrella Revolution has changed the understanding of “Chineseness”, and if a 
contradiction has emerged between Chinese- and Hong Kong identity. The issue of national 
identity is explored using (1) micro-theories on self and identity drawn from social 
psychology, (2) macro-level theories on nationalism, and (3) a theory on group psychology 
called social identity theory. Based on qualitative interviews with Hongkongers, this paper 
concludes that the vagueness of “Chinese-ness” leads to contradictions in how individuals talk 
about their identities. The contradictions are expressed (1) between the notion as an ethnic 
marker versus a territorial identity, and (2) in the argument that “Chineseness” is both 
primordial and historically-based yet also politically constructed. This provides support to the 
idea that identities are situationally constructed but also multiple.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: National identity, social identity theory, nationalism, social 
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1. Introduction. 
As a small limited democracy inside a large communist one-party state, Hong Kong is an 
unusual case because of a binding political agreement called the “One Country, Two 
System”-policy. This arrangement allows Hong Kong to exercise some level of autonomy, 
today having its own multiparty political system, judiciary, currency, language, and level of 
transparency/censorship. Yet, in a relatively recent article by the international news agency 
Reuters, written amidst the unfolding events of the 2014 Umbrella Revolution, the author 
notes a city that clearly struggles to renegotiate what it means to be “Chinese”1. One 
particular excerpt from the article reads: 
“To many in Hong Kong, then, “Chinese” may primarily mean 
a cultural, ethnic, or racial marker of identity rather than of 
political nationality. There are “Chinese” of various types who 
make up the majority population in Taiwan and Singapore, a 
significant percentage in Malaysia and Thailand, and large 
numbers around the world. 
So when the demonstrators chant “Hong Kong People!” they 
are asserting that to be a citizen of Hong Kong is emphatically 
not the same as being Chinese. For the authorities in Beijing, 
this may send shivers down their spines. Because there is 
nothing they hate and fear more than the center not holding, 
torn apart by rough beasts. They are unable to see that it is 
China’s own political shortcomings that encourage this 
fundamental debate and resulting protest.” 
As a former British colony, Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, swapping 
London with Beijing as Hong Kong’s political proxy. This change generated worry among 
many locals who foresaw a slow step-by-step rollback in civil liberties and democratic rights 
in favor of a much more restrictive type of politics. In an era where colonial empires are 
politically unfashionable, the handover of Hong Kong was unavoidable. However, it is not 
                                                          
1 Are ‘Hong Kong people’ still Chinese? Depends on how you define ‘Chinese’, Reuters Article, By Alan Chin, 
September 30, 2014, <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/09/30/are-hong-kong-people-still-chinese-
depends-on-how-you-define-chinese/?fb_action_ids=10152700639721335&fb_action_types=og.recommends> 
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difficult to see how Hong Kong has grown to become a very dissimilar place from mainland 
China during its colonial period, and how pro-Beijing politics now represents a foreign type 
of policymaking.  
In light of these historical circumstances, as well as recent events, national identity in Hong 
Kong becomes a complicated issue. The term “Chinese” holds both ethnic and civic 
connotations, but for many Hong Kong locals it is still relatively new as a national marker. 
Instead, labels such as “Hongkonger” holds greater emotional appeal. Lastly, with the 
demographic rise of a “born-in-Hong-Kong” generation, the cultivation of a Chinese national 
identity faces additional challenges. This thesis explores the issue of national identity in Hong 
Kong building on and adjudicating between a number of social science theories that can 
inform the study of national identities. It surveys micro-level theories of self and identity 
within social psychology, group level theory of social identity theory (SIT), and macro-level 
theories on nationalism to document the struggle of Hong Kongers in navigating their 
identities in the midst of political turmoil. Based on interviews with Hongkongers, the thesis 
finds evidence for individual struggle for identity but in ways that also manifest the lack of 
concrete definition of the national identity of the Hong Kong people. The vagueness in the 
meaning of “Chinese-ness” leads to contradictions in how individuals talk about their 
identities. The contradictions are expressed (1) between the notion as an ethnic marker versus 
a territorial identity that is based on affiliations with the mainland (a distinction which 
becomes salient in the course of contact with mainlanders), and (2) in the argument that 
“Chineseness” is both primordial and historically-based yet also politically constructed. This 
provides support to the idea that identities are situationally constructed but also multiple.  
2. Previous Research - A perspective from History. 
To understand the development of Hong Kong, both as a collective culture as well as how it 
effects the individual, a perspective from local history is needed. After roughly 150 years as a 
British colony, Hong Kong finally reverted back to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. This is held 
as a decisive victory for China given that Hong Kong had, during its colonial period, 
developed into a major economical hub and banking centre. For the last century, Hong Kong 
served as China’s entry gate into the global economy (Postiglione & Tang, 1997: 124; Siu, 
2011: 129). Likewise, some 13 million people in total (about half Chinese) are estimated to 
have passed through Hong Kong's harbor between 1880 and 1939 (Siu, 2011: 132). Much of 
Hong Kong distinctiveness can thus be attributed to its migratory legacy (Mathews et al, 
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2007: 24). This is related to, but not the same as, Hong Kong's colonial history, which will be 
further elaborated on bellow. 
Of course, Hong Kong predates its colonial period, having probably first been settled some 
5000 or 6000 years ago. Similarly, Hong Kong is found under the formal jurisdiction of China 
during most of recorded history. However, during the time of its colonization, the population 
of Hong Kong was sparse - a mere 7.500 in 1844 (Mathews et al, 2007: 22-23). Since 
colonization, the city, due not only to is colonial status but also its geographical location, has 
played a much more important role in the region as a "safe haven" for a number of migratory 
events - the Taiping rebellion in 1850; the escape from radical nationalists in 1900s; evading 
Japanese troops in 1937; and fleeing from communists in 1945 - resulting in periodic booms 
in population. Hence, Hong Kong came to be populated by people whose experience with 
politics had been violent and oppressive as opposed to a public endeavor, fostering a climate 
that was not just politically apathetic but even "anti-political" (Postiglione & Tang, 1997: 
viii). However, this climate turned out to be largely beneficial for local politicians, the police 
force, as well as local businessmen, who each respectively preferred a "docile" citizenry or 
workforce.  
The colonial government’s historical involvement in economic policy is also much less 
pronounced than those compared to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Instead, a 
“hands-off” approach was favored, in which the market regulates itself. As a result, the 
architectural landscape of Hong Kong came to be shaped by multiethnic sponsors and 
businessmen, given that many influential capitalist flocked to the city (Siu, 2011: 132). The 
underlying culture of Hong Kong therefore has a strong cosmopolitan legacy, i.e. international 
and multicultural, which makes capitalism and capitalist principles significant components of 
the local identity (Fung, 2008: 192-193). These conditions also orientated the individual 
towards a “market mentality”, which describes a broad social attitude in which people look at 
national identity as a “product” to be rationally assessed rather than emotionally felt 
(Mathews et al, 2007: 35, 105). However, even though the prosperity of Hong Kong is largely 
an outgrowth of both global and national interests, China is still, arguably, the single most 
influential factor. Without the close proximity of the Chinese market during both the Opium 
Wars and British Colonial rule, Hong Kong is unlikely to have grown into the commercial 
success it is today. But the presence of global values in the local culture did shield Hong 
Kong from nationalist interventions that occurred on the mainland. By appropriating a global 
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culture into the local identity formation, it served as a competing force against Chinese 
nationalistic discourses (Fung, 2008: 200).  
Yet, despite the city’s close geographical vicinity as well as cultural ties with China, Hong 
Kong was effectively cut off from the mainland in the 50s due to the PRC, who did not open 
up its national borders again until the 70s (Keading, 2011: 3). During this period, Hong Kong 
was considerably more free to develop its own social and political mores, characterized by 
minimum manipulation from China. The extent to which Hong Kong was able to exercise 
cultural freedom, such as in the case of media consumption, is a significant force in the 
creative reinvention of local identity. If Beijing was to institute greater ideological control, it 
would obstruct Hong Kong's ability to assert itself on the international stage (Postiglione & 
Tang, 1997: 236).  
So, in short summary; Hong Kong is shaped heavily by its relatively recent migratory legacy 
and facilitated Chinas access to the global economy. Hong Kong’s colonial status made it a 
protective zone for many Chinese refugees, who sought to escape political persecution on the 
mainland. Also, the colonial government can be described as a non-interventionist 
government, who permitted much in terms of civil liberties and instead focused on 
commercial success, of which the Chinese market was crucial. Characterized by capitalist 
principles, Hong Kong has today grown into a cosmopolitan society, build and shape by a 
mercantile class of entrepreneurs who came from very diverse cultural places around the 
world. These capitalist conditions also orientated local individuals towards a “market 
mentality”, which not only acted as a competing forces with Chinese nationalism but also 
made people look at national identity as something to be rationally evaluated rather than 
emotionally sensed. Lastly, Hong Kong has been able to exercise a level of cultural freedom 
that has enabled individual to experiment with identity with minimum manipulation from the 
cultural politics of China.  
2.1. One Country, Two Systems. 
Hong Kong is a limited democracy inside a communist state. But under the policy "One 
Country, Two Systems", Hong Kong remains a semi-autonomous city-state, or "Special 
Administrative Region", holding many liberal freedoms that are currently denied in China. As 
a quick example; Hong Kong enjoys a level of press freedom that is second only to Japan in 
Asia (Postiglione & Tang, 1997: 230). Likewise, as a heavily "westernized" city, Hong Kong 
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encapsulates many values that are generally attributed to western cultures, such as freedom of 
expression, and tend to stress privacy and equality as inherent traits of individual rights 
(Keading, 2011: 4). Hong Kong is, by many estimates, one of the most open economies for 
conducting business ventures.  
Even though Beijing has promised Hong Kong's relative autonomy via the "One Country, 
Two Systems"-policy, allowing the city-state to pursue its own interests on the international 
arena in regards to economics and culture, diplomacy still remains the purview of the Beijing 
Central Government. This essentially means that Hong Kong has to operate within the 
framework of the Chinese foreign policy. As a consequence, Hong Kong has to defer its 
political membership in many international organizations to China in cases where both are 
already represented. Furthermore, in cases where China's international relations with a foreign 
nation may be poor, Beijing can limit or infringe on Hong Kong's ability to interact with that 
state (Postiglione & Tang, 1997: 9-10). For example, Hong Kong's political relationship with 
America is now at the hands of the Central Government, which is of incredible inconvenience 
for both the local Hong Kong government and businesses given that America constitutes a 
major employer and economical contributor in the region (Postiglione & Tang, 1997: 12). 
This challenges Hong Kong's international independence.  
Will Hong Kong eventually acclimate itself to Chinese values and social mores, or will they 
remain diffidently independent? This is a sensitive issue for the Beijing Central Government. 
Owing to Hong Kong's geographic location, neighboring regions such as Guangdong and 
Shenzhen are at risk of Hong Kong's "corrupting" cultural influence. Such vicinity could 
cultivate the spread of international values, which the Communist Party may hold as 
politically antagonistic or incompatible (Postiglione & Tang, 1997: 15). While such values are 
tolerated within the confines of Hong Kong itself, the task is to "limit" their proliferation 
outside the special administrative region. Regardless, it is in the mutual interest of both Hong 
Kong and Beijing to keep Hong Kong's economical capacity intact. China is an important 
market for Hong Kong and is therefore likely to be an influential factor in the continued 
evolution of Hong Kong. However, that said, Hong Kong is also likely to remain 
exceptionally globalized and internationalized compared to many other cities on the Chinese 
mainland (Postiglione & Tang, 1997: 18). 
 
 
10 
 
2.2. Existing Thoughts on Hong Kong Identity. 
In today's global society, the existence of the market and the state are two discursive 
principles that receive near omnipresent status - their reality are taken for granted by most 
people around the world (Mathews et al, 2007: 13). In the case of Hong Kong however, due to 
its unusual historical legacy and colonial government, locals have been left with a very 
limited experience of state interventions (though this is likely to change). Furthermore, since 
many early migrants came to Hong Kong as refugees, seeking to avoid political persecution, 
political apathy became a widespread norm. Instead, a distinct “market mentality” came to 
dominate the social climate of Hong Kong. China remained the primary source for ethnic 
roots, but a sense of national identity was largely absent or unnecessary. Even long into later 
generations, the discourse of the state was distant and foreign, Hongkongers focusing instead 
on private finances, household economy, and making a living (Mathews et al, 2007: 14-16). 
However, as we move beyond a decade since the handover, the presence of the Chinese state 
has progressively made its presence known.  
An early attempt at describing a new emerging Hong Kong identity includes the "Hong Kong 
Man" - i.e. a westernized Chinese, but still different from the British Colonizers (Keading, 
2011: 3). Furthermore, another depiction of Hong Kong during the early post-war period was 
that of "a lifeboat", whose local populace where characterized by a "refugee mentality" which 
eschewed politics, or at least subpar politics. The "lifeboat"-imagery was specifically used to 
capture four interrelated aspects of the local culture. (1) Firstly, it described a willful attempt 
at avoiding taking a strong stance in the political rivalry that existed between the nationalist- 
and communist regimes in China. This conflict created two inconsistent notions of what is 
meant to be a Chinese national, but Hong Kong served as a third "neutral" option. (2) Second, 
it was meant to showcase the acceptance of Hong Kong's colonial status, where the economic 
and political situation was deemed as stable whilst it was not in China. In means that peoples 
could somewhat freely and comfortably focus on personal pursuits, such as making a living. 
(3) Thirdly, the "refugee mentality" was an expression of survival instincts. People looked 
toward short-term rewards, as opposed to investing in long-term plans with uncertain endings 
or gains. Surviving the "now" was a much more urgent concern, and Hong Kong provided a 
more reliable social climate for doing so. (4) Lastly, the term implied a sense of 
"rootlessness", and that few of the Chinese migrants really intended everlasting residence in 
Hong Kong. The non-interest in local politics, especially during British colonial rule, was 
based on short-term assumption regarding the duration of their stay. The fact that many 
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migrants eventually decided to permanently remain in Hong Kong was an unintended 
outcome (Mathews et al, 2007: 27-28; Keading, 2011: 6). This "refugee mentality" was a 
precursor that laid the foundation of the previously mentioned "market mentality" (Mathews 
et al, 2007: 29). 
Bearing in mind Hong Kong's colonial status, nationalist sentiments have been a 
comparatively weak force in the local Chinese community, who instead opted for calling 
themselves "Hong Kongers" (or other variations) rather than "Chinese". While under British 
rule, Hong Kong was characterized by a limited government that focused primarily on 
commercial interest (Postiglione & Tang, 1997: 5). Anti-colonial campaigns remained few 
and spaced out, never achieving any serious consideration in the public agenda (Mathews et 
al, 2007: 24). On the contrary, the colonial government generally received good support from 
the Chinese community, who viewed them as a pragmatic and efficient administration. Since 
a considerable portion of the population prior to the Second World War was of migratory 
background - many directly seeking to avoid persecution from Chinese authorities - few 
political demands was put on the already lenient and open colonial government. Similarly, the 
reward for perusing political action was held to be of questionable merit and worth (Ibid.). 
Not until the 70s did such political demands find their way onto the political agenda, when 
great economic prosperity resulted in growing concerns in regards to social issues such as 
education and housing. The grassroots elites came coordinate such efforts, eventually laying 
the foundation for democratic participation (Mengmeng, 2010: 11).  
The importance of media in relations to the development of local culture is noncontroversial. 
“Media” in this context includes everything from film to printed press. Due to Hong Kong's 
non-interventionist politics and lack of hegemonic culture during its colonial period, local 
media has generally been characterized by creative freedom (Mathews et al, 2007: 60). These 
conditions gave ample space for the transmission of a "depoliticized" version of Chinese 
identity which, consequently, resulted in the "othering" of the mainland Chinese. This created 
a psychological distance between themselves and China, allowing for the development of a 
distinct local identity. Sometimes, such dissimilarities were especially emphasized (Keading, 
2011: 3-4). Because of the "one country, two system"-policy, China is not able to directly 
transport its national censorship system onto Hong Kong. Instead, Beijing has employed a 
strategy of slow cooption of media, using Hong Kong’s free market against itself to acquire 
ownership. This shift in ownership has left many locals to decry the ongoing development as 
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"the death of the traditional intellectual-operated media” (Chan & Lee, 2007: 50; 
Mengmeng, 2010: 64). It is a cooptation based not on political pressure, but on the allure of 
money and market demands. Local media has come to tailor their discourse such that media 
companies don't get blocked on the mainland. Essentially, it is a matter of self-censorship 
(Mathews et al, 2007: 60-61).  
Regardless, political participation, be it on both on local and international levels, today makes 
for an important contemporary social issues in Hong Kong. There is equal skepticism among 
all locals in regards to the power of the Chinese state, and their ability to preserve Hong 
Kong's independence (Postiglione & Tang, 1997: 8). 
2.3. The Umbrella Revolution. 
As a relatively recent and fresh historical event, the long-term consequences (if any) of the 
2014 Umbrella Revolution are yet to be seen, but the Umbrella Movement itself, which began 
in September and persisted for about two months, is largely a continuation of the “1st July 
Protests”. The pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong organize an annual civic protest ever 
since 1997 - the “1st July Protest/March” - during which demonstrators voice their support for 
the expansion of human- and democratic rights. Several pro-democracy groups already 
affiliated with the July Protests later returned in the Umbrella Movement, in particular the 
Civil Human Rights Front. However, just prior to the annual 2014 protest, in a White Paper 
released by Beijing in June 2014, the Central Government proclaimed that the central 
leadership exercise full jurisdiction in all "special administrative regions" of China, including 
Hong Kong: 
"As a unitary state, China's central government has 
comprehensive jurisdiction over all local administrative regions, 
including the HKSAR. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR 
is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the 
authorization by the central leadership." 2 
A stated, the Chinese government has the power to redefine the "One Country, Two System"-
policy and intervene in Hong Kong politics. This made many forecasts manipulation in the 
                                                          
2 The Practice of the "One Country, Two Systems" Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
Xinhuanet, 2014-06-10, Editor: chengyang, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-
06/10/c_133396891_11.htm> 
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upcoming 2017 election. As predicted, not long after, the issue that would spark additional 
controversy and inflate events into the now much more widely known Umbrella 
Revolution/Movement, came after a purposed electoral reform by the central authorities in 
Beijing (which is still an ongoing debate) which only permits political candidates who have 
been pre-approved by a nominating committee to participate in the 2017 Hong Kong election. 
More precisely, the provision as stated demands that: 
"II. When the selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region is implemented by the method of 
universal suffrage: 
(1) A broadly representative nominating committee shall be 
formed. The provisions for the number of members, composition 
and formation method of the nominating committee shall be 
made in accordance with the number of members, composition 
and formation method of the Election Committee for the Fourth 
Chief Executive. 
(2) The nominating committee shall nominate two to three 
candidates for the office of Chief Executive in accordance with 
democratic procedures. Each candidate must have the 
endorsement of more than half of all the members of the 
nominating committee. 
(3) All eligible electors of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region have the right to vote in the election of the Chief 
Executive and elect one of the candidates for the office of Chief 
Executive in accordance with law. 
(4) The Chief Executive-elect, after being selected through 
universal suffrage, will have to be appointed by the Central 
People's Government." 3 
                                                          
3 The Practice of the "One Country, Two Systems" Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
Chinese White Paper (pg. 3), Xinhuanet, 2014-06-10, Editor: chengyang, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/31/c_133609238_3.htm 
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An additional provision also include that the candidates must "love the country and love Hong 
Kong", which many take as a vague and suspicious euphemism for nationalistic, or pro-
Beijing, values. But this new direction in the electoral method effectively puts candidates in 
the control of the central leadership of China, which severely undermines the demands for 
universal suffrage as advocated by the pro-democracy movement. While the 2014 protests 
themselves have seized, the development of this controversy is still ongoing and the 
upcoming 2015 annual protest is likely to echo the concerns of the Umbrella Revolution.  
Arguably, the Umbrella Revolution is a significant event in the formation of local identity. 
Firstly, conflicts themselves are contribute to creating in-group/out-group boundaries, or 
bolster the salience of already preexisting in-group and out-group distinctions. Secondly, 
conflicts like the Umbrella Revolution can make individuals reevaluate previous values and 
identities. Therefore, it is important to ask how these situational developments have 
influenced the self-identification of the locals and how Hong Kong people think about their 
locations within the ever-changing political landscape. 
3. Research Area and Research Question. 
As the dust settles from the scuffles that is now the Umbrella Revolution, many Hong Kong 
locals find themselves in the process of renegotiating their 'Chineseness'. Hence, a research 
question can be formulated in the following manner: 
 How has the Umbrella revolution affected Hong Kong identity? 
 How do Hong Kong people understand "Chineseness" in the aftermath of the 
Umbrella Revolution? 
 How is the notion of “Chinese-ness” understood, and is it understood as being in 
contradiction to “Hong Kong identity”?  
The purpose is to do a nuanced study on identity. Furthermore, secondary data, such a survey 
polls, will be used to supplement the primary data. In 2013 (16 years after the handover), only 
about 21.8% of the people surveyed was comfortable labeling themselves as "Chinese"4, 
many others opting for alternatives such as "Hongkonger" or "Hongkongnese" (Chan, 2014: 
25). However, these survey instruments that require individuals to select only one of the 
                                                          
4 Public Opinion Centre "POP Poll", The University of Hong Kong (accessed on 4th of January 2015), 
<http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/datatables.html> 
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following are fundamentally flawed in that they fail to capture the complexity and multiplicity 
inherent in the Hong Kong identity. While some scholars argue that "Chinese" and 
"Hongkonger" have binary qualities, in other words, one identifies as either one or the other 
(Keading, 2011: 2; Ma & Fung, 2008: 173), individual interactions with the Hong Kong 
people reveals that the underlying dynamics are much more complicated and often 
contradictory. Therefore, it is crucial to ask how to conceptualize the question of national 
identity and analyze the current situational developments in Hong Kong identity.  
4. Theories on Identity. 
There are more than one theory on identity and I will endeavor in this chapter to discuss at 
least four such perspectives – (1) social psychological theories on identity; (2) constructivist 
theories on nationalism; (3) essentialism/primordialist theories on nationalism; and lastly, (4) 
Social Identity Theory (SIT). But these theories operate on different levels, meaning that 
some deal directly with individuals, while others focus more on group psychology. The above 
four perspectives can be divided into three levels of analysis – (1) micro-level (ex. 
individuals); (2) meso-levels (ex. communities, the state); and (3) macro-level (ex. nations, 
society).  
The social psychology perspective is concentrated on the micro-level, dealing with the 
psychology of individuals, and will be the first theory to be discussed. Next, I will discuss two 
theories on nationalism, namely the constructivist and essentialist/primordialist perspectives. 
Both of these perspectives make exclusive assumptions about the nature of human behavior, 
but both are operating on a macro-level of analysis. Lastly, I will discuss Social Identity 
Theory (SIT), which takes the position as a meso-level theory.  
4.1. The Micro-Level: Social Psychology. 
Subjective experience is central to the formation of identity, which depend on at least some 
level self-awareness and consciousness. "Identity”, as mostly used in social psychology, can 
be understood as self-perceived "traits and characteristics, social relations, roles, and social 
group memberships that define who one is" (Oyserman et al, 2012: 69). Identity can also be 
conceptualized as narratives, i.e. stories we tell our self and others about who we are, as well 
as how we would like to be. This can be termed the “narrative approach” (Yuval-Davis, 2010: 
266). “Narratives” in this context need not be verbal articulations but can also be constructed 
through physical practices and actions. Identities are versatile in the sense that it involves not 
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just one’s current forms of identity, but also include past experiences (memory) and future 
expectations (ex. aspirations, obligations, etc). Identity provides a lens for meaning-making 
and focuses your attention towards certain features in your immediate social context. Finally, 
the term “Self-concept” refers to the combined collection of identities (Oyserman & James, 
2011: 117-119; Oyserman et al, 2012: 69). Since “identity” in this context refers to social 
relations, any kind of identity becomes by definition social. As such, identities are not a fixed 
constructs because changes in personal relations may produce new forms of identity.  
National identity, as defined in this thesis, is a social identity about community and belonging.  
National identities hold emotional attractions and can acts as a socially binding force between 
people. However, they can also have profound impact on a person's self-concept and overall 
worldview, as they typically includes a set of values and common beliefs, a national history, 
conventions about social interaction, as well as a sense of national memory about previous 
achievements (Kelman, 1997: 172). As a social identity, national identities are collective 
products, and by asking about individual’s national identity, we are, in effect, asking how that 
individual incorporates the elements of that national identity into his/her self-concept. I.e., to 
what degree do people adopt the normative beliefs, values, assumption, and expectations of 
that group? Not all narratives relating to identity are necessarily directly about group 
belonging or collectivity. Many narratives are instead about personal traits and characteristics, 
such as body image, skills and talents, and future aspirations. However, even such narratives 
have indirect concrescences for the perception of “Others”, and how to place you self in 
relation to certain groups (Yuval-Davis, 2010: 267).  
National identity can also be compared to “collective identity narratives”, which give 
individuals a sense of personal agency while also providing meaning and continuity in the 
collective order (Yuval-Davis, 2010: 267). This receives further implication when transported 
to the landscape of politics. The term "identity politics" is sometimes broadly used to signify a 
number of political projects and/or social movements wherein the aim has been greater 
political inclusiveness and representation. For many, identity politics develops into a struggle 
for recognition and belonging; to have one's subjective experience acknowledged. For this 
reason, identity politics is typically a response to some kind of perceived oppression, where 
actors seek to replace negative cultural roles, or scripts, with more desirable alternatives, often 
through various methods of consciousness-raising (Heyes, 2014; Yuval-Davis, 2010: 266).  
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In summary, national identity can be described as a social experience, or interaction with 
social groups, that includes collective narratives. On the individual level, national identity 
provide people with a sense of historical continuity as well as unity with other people across 
geographic distance. By adopting a sense nationality into their self-concept, it contributes to 
their overall worldview by prescribing values, assumptions, and expectations. National 
identity is not a fixed construct but dependent on social relation and may change over time. 
4.2. The Macro-Level: Theories on nationalism. 
In today's global world, having or belonging to a nationality is just a "natural" experience. 
Nation-states have become a normal discursive principle in the current political context and 
for many it is even difficult to imagine being without a nation or nationality (Mathews et al, 
2007: 1). Even though individuals may regard themselves as inclusive of a certain nationality, 
nations-states themselves are not solely dependent on the mental constructs of individual 
members. Instead, nations exist independently through various symbolic artifacts, historical 
documents, writings, institutions, or traditions. Moreover, individuals may be of different 
opinions, as well as emotional commitment, on how to define the nation. Yet, national 
identity is a collective product, not an individual one (Kelman, 1997: 171-172). But how then 
can we explain the emergence of nations in the modern world? The literature is here largely 
split into two exclusive camps: (1) a constructivist perspective and (2) a 
primordialist/essentialist perspective. 
4.2.1. Constructivism. 
The conception of a nation as an "imagined community" has grown increasingly prevalent 
within sociological literature during the last decade (Mengmeng, 2010: 40; Wodak et al, 2009: 
186). This theory originates in the writings of Benedict Anderson who works from the 
constructivist school of thought. He argues that national communities are "imagined" given 
that most nation-members will never personally meet or know each other directly, but will 
instead invent a bond of national solidarity between them (Anderson, 2006: 6). In psychology, 
this phenomenon may be referred to as a "psychological group". Comparable to Anderson 
definition, members in a psychological group need not know or interact with each other 
personally. The only requirement is that an individual perceive him- or herself as being 
included in a certain group (Ashforth & Meal, 1989: 24). But nationality, Anderson continues 
to explain, is a very "modular" construct, compatible with a vast variety of political schools 
and ideologies, and tend to very difficult to dismiss or remove once a sense of nationally has 
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become entrenched in the collective psyche and historical memory. But as such, national 
communities are historical constructs, or as Anderson put it, "cultural artefacts", and to best 
understand the formation of a nationality one has to carefully study the historical forces that 
underpin the construction of any one nation (Anderson, 2006: 4). 
Anderson, like other constructivists, as well as modernists in general, subscribes to a view of 
nations, the international order, and nationalism, as relatively recent constructions, born out of 
modern conditions such as capitalism, secularism, industrialization, urbanization, and other 
current forms of bureaucracy (Smith, 2000: 3-4). Anderson here coins the term “print-
capitalism” as a way to describe the rise of national consciousness in Europe. Because of an 
emerging capitalist market between the 16th and 18th Century, the printing press would, in due 
course, lead to the standardization of a national vernacular and common discourses. The 
previous literate elite of a few Latin-readers eventually had to give way, once their market 
was saturated, to a much broader audience of monolinguals. Similarly, regional dialects and 
differences slowly eroded in favor of a national print-language. While a national vernacular is 
not itself the cause of nationalism, it was an important step in the development of a national 
awareness and mass communication. “Print-capitalism” was largely an unguided process that 
merely reflects the interplay of technology and capitalism. But still, it would lay the 
foundation of the nation as an “imagined community” that could later be exploited by a new 
(19th Century) generation of nationalists (Anderson, 2006: Chapter 3). However, China is a 
very different case since many southern provinces, including Hong Kong, more commonly 
speak Cantonese rather than Mandarin (and other languages in other regions). This introduces 
linguistic barriers that may obstruct people’s ability to think themselves as fellow nationals or 
as an imagined community. 
Another strong proponent of the modernist position, who espouses this idea of nations as 
modern constructions, is Ernest Geller. Geller argues that people of pre-modern societies 
where primarily agro-literate communities, consisting primarily of farmer and food producers, 
who organized themselves into self-sufficient local cultures but otherwise lacked a sense of 
nationality (Smith, 2000: 4). Rather, it is a recent (1800s and onwards) wave of nationalism, 
grounded in modern conditions, that has invented a sense of nationality where none existed 
before – i.e. nationalism created nations, rather than the reverse, because nations are not an 
intrinsic quality of humanity (though nationality as become a taken-for-granted experience in 
the modern era) (Geller, 1983: 6; Smith, 2000: 5).  
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But what does Geller mean by “political unit” and “national unit”? Simply put, the “political 
unit” is the state. Geller’s definition of the state is inspired by Max Webber, in which the state 
is defined as the “agency within society which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence” 
(Geller, 1983: 3). In other words; in a society where all manner of legitimate violence can 
only be applied by a centralized agency (or group of connected agencies), as well as any to 
whom it delegates these responsibilities (ex. the police force), unescapably becomes the state 
on the virtue of that monopoly on violence (Geller, 1983: 4).  
By "nationalist unit", or nation in this context, Geller applies a somewhat more complex but 
vague definition as an ethic-cultural unit. Basically, any two people who recognize each other 
as mutual fellows, and can presuppose a set of shared rights and duties based on it, has the 
potential to become nation (Geller, 1983: 7). Geller explains his standpoint by problematize 
some widely used definitions – primarily those that delineate a nation as only being of a 
“shared culture”, or it being an act of self-identification, i.e. “will”. Both such definitions are 
problematic if used on their own; the former having the problem that not all cultures have 
fixed and definite boundaries, but mix, blend and intermingle in complex patterns. 
Furthermore, it would exclude many modern nations that are today characterized by cultural 
pluralism. Similarly, the latter issue of “will” have the problem of also encompassing small 
social groups, ex. gangs or sport teams, to whom a “nation” would be an overly broad, if not 
inappropriate, descriptor (Geller, 1983: 53-55). Rather, Geller concludes that (as previously 
stated) nationalism creates nations, and “culture” and “will” can only be used to define a 
nation in the modern era of nationalism where culture also becomes the source for political 
legitimacy – that is to say the fusion of culture, will , and politics (Geller, 1983: 55). It is thus 
nationalism that drives the demands for cultural homogeneity, not the other way around, and 
it does so in the pursuit of “high culture”, which is a much needed element for an industrial 
society which is orientated towards growth (Geller, 1983: 56-57; Smith, 2000: 8). Hence, the 
“nation” is a modern construction.  
There are multiple ways in which the nationalist principle can be violated, but most depend on 
local circumstances. But there is one such violation the principle is especially vulnerable. 
Geller writes (next page): 
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“if the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than 
that of the majority of the ruled, this, for nationalists, constitutes 
a quite outstandingly intolerable breech in political propriety.” 
    - (Geller, 
1983: 1) 
Geller’s conceptualization of nationalism is that it is susceptible to the human weakness for 
partiality. Furthermore, the number of potential nations in the contemporary world greatly 
outnumbers the current available states, which means that not all nationalist movement can be 
gratified (Geller, 1987: 2). However, nationalism is dependent, if not even “parasitic”, to the 
prior existence of a recognized state. Where there is no state, the principle of nationalism 
cannot be violated. A stateless society can therefore not experience nationalism (Geller, 1987: 
4). 
4.2.2. Essentialism and primordialism. 
In opposition to the constructivist perspective, as represented by Anderson and Geller in the 
previous chapter, is an essentialist school of thought. This perspective entails the view that 
biology, lineage, ethnicity, language, and territory, all possess inherent qualities that 
necessarily result in certain types of group identities (Keading, 2011: 2). Nations and 
nationality can also be conceptualized in a similar manner, in which case it is more commonly 
referred to as “primordialism”. In this logic, nations possess “primordial attachment”, which 
emphasizes long-term kinship and cultural bonds (Smith, 2000: 2). The term is dated to 
Edward Shils in 1957, who wrote that modern society is “held together by an infinity of 
personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts, professional and creative pride, 
individual ambition, primordial affinities and a civil sense” (Shils 1957, p. 131, as cited by 
Bayar, 2009: 1641). 
According to primordial scholars like Anthony D. Smith, a “nation” is a named population 
with common ancestry (sometimes referred to as “ethnie” in his writings), who share a 
territory and cultural history, and includes practices like a common economy, a public culture, 
as well as some mutual understanding of rights and duties. Nations further legitimize their 
territorial sovereignty in the eyes of the outside world through the use of a state apparatus. 
Finally, “nationalism”, as he describes it, is an ideological movement, the aims of which are 
to keep the nation and the state, as it is perceived by some of its members, as autonomous and 
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unified as possible (Smith, 2000: 1). But unlike Geller and Anderson, Smith wants to 
reintroduce the importance of ethnicity and cultural ties for the emergence of nationalism 
(Smith, 2000: 7). In this conceptualization, nationalism can be said to be the historical 
continuation of ethnic attachment. As such, some nations have existed prior to modern times, 
and many modern nations can trace their ancestry to kingdoms such as England or Scotland, 
or even more ancient civilizations such as the Greeks or Egyptians.  
But this is not to say that nations have “always” existed. Smith partly agrees that nations are 
modern creations, but there is also a continuous link between modern nations and pre-modern 
‘ethnies’ that the constructivists, he argues, tend to ignore (Smith, 2000: 14). Smith wants to, 
in this context, distinguish between “civic” and “ethnic” nations, which he describes as two 
different ‘paths’ to nationhood. In a civic nation, citizens are members of a territorial political 
community who share a legal system and mass public culture (ex. language). Membership is 
automatically granted to anyone born within said territory. It is also relatively easy for non-
nationals to become a citizen of a civic nation – local residency for a prescribed period of 
time, as well as the adoption of the local culture and/or language, will usually suffice (Smith, 
2000: 16). In an ethnic nation however, citizens are related through common decent, and the 
importance of ethno-history is heavily emphasized such that it makes them distinct in term of 
local customs in relation to outsiders. It is also very difficult for outsiders to become a citizen 
of an ethnic nation since membership is largely based on genealogy (Ibid.). These two types 
of nations have consequences, especially in the treatment of immigrants. However, Smith also 
purposes a third type of nation – the cultural nation - which is a mix of the ethnic and civic 
paths. In a cultural nation, membership is based on a combination of territorial residence, as 
per the civic ideal, but also assimilation into the dominant ethnic culture. It is Smiths 
observation that the majority of nations today is of this third type; the cultural nation. This is 
because a nation can change its ‘type’, and move back and forth on the civic-ethnic spectrum 
to varying degrees (Smith, 2000: 17). 
In addition to the thoughts purposed by Anthony Smith, primordialism can also encompassed 
a sociobiological perspective, such as those held by Pierre Van den Berghe. Where the 
constructivists, as he describes them, subscribe to an incredibly plastic understanding of 
human behavior, shaped almost exclusively by culture, Van den Berghe argues that human 
behavior is also the product of Darwinian natural selection, i.e. evolution. Hence, human 
behavior can be analyzed on the levels of genetics and ecology in addition to culture (Van den 
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Berghe, 1987: 5). Indeed, using the model of evolutionary biology, some scholars assert that 
phenotypic similarity promote positive in-group behavior, greater cooperation, and lowers the 
threshold for altruistic behavior towards “similar others”, or “kin” (McDonald, 2001: 69). 
Therefore, the argument is that we are genetically predisposed towards ethnocentrism and 
nepotism; ethnic and racial sentiments are the extension of kin selection (Van den Berghe, 
1987: 18-19). However, sociobiology operates more on the micro- and meso-level of analysis, 
not the macro-level like other theories on nationalism. But sociobiology is still a theory that 
falls inside the essentialist/primordialist framework of thinking in so much as it supports to 
the idea that ethnicity carry a “primordial attachment” that facilitates in-group solidarity. 
4.2.3. Summary 
The clash of primordialism and constructivism is both old and ongoing. While it is not the 
goal of this thesis to participate in this debate, it is important to note that modern nationalism 
as expressed today is recent. It is also important to note that nationalism is described as the 
aspiration for social, political, and cultural homogony, which seeks to make competing 
identities irrelevant. The difference is that primordialism emphasis nationalism as intrinsic 
and inherent, the extension of biology, where constructivism says it is a socially constructed 
sentiment. Lastly, both school sees nationalism as collective identities.  
4.3. The Meso-Level: Social Identity Theory (SIT). 
A theory is needed to bridge or synthesize the micro- and macro-level, that can add to our 
understanding of the mechanisms behind group psychology. From the writings of Tajfel and 
Turner, we receive the framework of "Social Identity Theory" (SIT). SIT is complimentary to 
the theories on nationalism because SIT do not itself explain how individuals come to value 
certain types of group identities (ex. social class) as more meaningful than others. Such a 
thing is instead determined by the undercurrents of historical and societal forces. However, 
SIT do provide an operational explanation for the interaction of social groups once a certain 
identity becomes entrenched. 
SIT formulates the predication that "in-groups" (us/self) are strong purveyors of pride and 
self-esteem, and people will seek to strengthen their own self-image by finding flaws in, or 
discriminate against, the perceived "out-group" (them/others) (McLeod, 2008; Cote & Levin, 
2002: 23-24). Furthermore, groups are inclined towards in-group favoritism regardless of the 
formal structure of the in-group, which may be only vaguely defined, without formal 
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membership or leaders. Favoritism is known to occurs even under the most minimal of 
conditions (Ashforth & Meal, 1989: 24; Huddy, 2001: 128). Groups, or social categories, can 
be diverse, including religious affiliation, gender, age, organizational membership, or - as is 
most relevant for this thesis - nationality. Such groups will be defined by traits that are 
abstracted from its current member base, which can be either (or both) psychological and 
physical in nature (Ashforth & Meal, 1989: 20).  
TIS is dependent on another parallel mental practice referred to as "stereotyping", in which 
people (1) exaggerate the shared characteristics found within the in-group, while also (2) 
exaggerate the differences between the in-group and out-group (McLeod, 2008). And yes, 
stereotyping result in faulty, or unreliable, assessment of people (Ashforth & Meal, 1989: 21). 
However, it is still a vital cognitive function for how we organize our social world, as well as 
how we filter our real life experiences. 
The formation of intergroup relations, as predicted by SIT, are the result of three underlying 
cognitive processes; (1) social categorization, (2) social identification, and (3) social 
comparison (McLeod, 2008). Social categorization is the mental process that allows people to 
orientate themselves in their social environment, including the ability to recognize the 
function or fate of a certain group. Categorization, or classification, is reliant on upon the self-
concept, which includes a person’s many social identities. A person can be either an actual 
member (ex. in the case of physical traits or by category) or a symbolic member of any certain 
number of group(s) (Ashforth & Meal, 1989: 21). Many types of classification are relational 
and comparative in nature, meaning that categories such as “new” and “old”, “tall” and 
“short”, are only made only significant in relation to one other.  
Some scholars levy criticism towards SITs ability to explain social phenomena such as 
nationality, saying that the theory focuses too much on the mere existence of groups and in-
group inclusion, but overlooks the existence of an "internalized subjective identity", that 
national identity is a personal experience with subjective meaning (Huddy, 2001: 130). Two 
major points of criticism can be formulated as; (1) SIT assumes uniform group development 
and therefore cannot explain why certain individuals decide to identify as a group member; 
and (2) SIT assumes social identities as being an "all-or-none phenomena" (Huddy, 2001: 
31). However, social identities need not always be a case of "all-or-none" but do indeed allow 
for a matter of degree. While some classifications may indeed be exclusionary or categorical 
(ex. gender), the extent to which a person invest his/her self-concept into that identity may 
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vary (Ashforth & Meal, 1989: 21). Some people, for example, may hold their political 
orientation as more significant for defining their self-concept than their gender, holding the 
latter as "only" a matter of category. The cognitive process whereby a person actually starts 
perceiving him- or herself as included in a certain group is referred to as Social identification. 
Social categorization, by contrast, concerns itself only with the creation of social groups, 
regardless if he/she fit the definition or not (McLeod, 2008). There is also little cause to 
assume a uniform definition of national identities. Though some may invest heavily in their 
national identity, the experience and meaning of what it means to be a national is likely to be 
different from person to person. However, it is unsure if the existence of in-group differences 
of is a challenge, or is inconsistent, to the overall framework of SIT. If nothing else, SIT does 
not prohibit the formation of schisms. 
Social identification is unto itself a complicated mental process that can, again, be a matter of 
degree. But identification is considered to have taken place when an individual starts 
perceiving him- or herself as entangled with the fate of a certain group, both in regards to the 
groups failures and successes - ex. you identify as a fan of your favorite football-team when 
you are emotionally committed in that team's outcome, be it success or loss (Ashforth & 
Meal, 1989: 21). However, a distinction needs to be made between identification and 
internalization. Where identification is the process of including oneself as a member of a 
certain group (which may still only be superficial or categorical), internalization refers to the 
process where an individual actually adopts the values or goals of a group as his- or her own 
(Ashforth & Meal, 1989: 21-22). Several factors interplay with a person tendency to 
positively identify with a certain group, and subsequently internalize the values of said group. 
Such factors include; (1) the distinctiveness of the group, i.e. the level by which the group 
stands out, or is made distinct, from others; (2) the current prestige or status of the social 
group (generally, the more popular, the better); (3) the pronounced presence, or salience, of 
out-groups who may already define, or reinforce, certain boundaries (ex. masculinity vs. 
feminine), which are made even more prominent during cases of extreme competition; and 
finally (4), common dynamic factors such as a shared history, level of interpersonal 
interaction, similarity, mutual aims, common threats, geographic proximity, etc. (Ashforth & 
Meal, 1989: 24-25). 
Finally, social comparison is when individuals assess one social group (usually one in which 
he/she is a member) with another, which can be either a negative or positive intergroup 
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comparison. A comparison need not be underscore by a sense of animosity or rivalry (though 
it can). Instead, like previously explained, SIT predict that group identification is a source of 
self-esteem and, hence, people will seek to improve their in-group status (Ashforth & Meal, 
1989: 22; McLeod, 2008). The implication here, rather, is that negative in-group traits will be 
recast as positive qualities, and that the defensive bias of the in-group will match up with the 
perceived level of threat from the out-group (Ashforth & Meal, 1989: 24). Rivalry may or 
may not be a factor during comparison, but can also arise as a result. 
5. Hypothesis. 
These above theories lead to a set of hypotheses that are applicable to the Hong Kong 
situation.  
1. Social psychological theories of identity predicts that identities develop through struggles 
for political recognition and belonging through processes of “collective narrative.” We can 
predict that: 
 The Umbrella Revolution will have a salient effect on how people narrativize their 
identities.  
 A sense of threat might result in a local identity that is more hostile to Chinese 
nationalism.  
2. Macro-theories of nationalism argue that nations are recent creations and national identity 
relies on people’s acquisition of historical knowledge, as well as awareness about the cultural 
context of beliefs and values. (Kelman, 1997: 173).  This leads to the hypothesis that: 
 Differential levels of historical understanding will lead to differential awareness of 
national identities and cultural identification of Hong Kongers with mainlanders. 
3. Group-level theories of Social Identity Theory emphasizes how individuals utilize 
schematic understandings regarding group categories to draw large distinctions with others 
who do no share group characteristics while particularly sympathize with those who share 
similar characteristics.  This leads us to hypothesize the following: 
 The complex political situation of Hong Kong will lead individuals to draw 
differential group boundaries vis-à-vis China.  
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 The group boundaries, however, will be also affected by the vagueness of “Chinese-
ness” and the everyday reference of “Chinese-ness” as a ethnic market, a territorial or 
civic identity.  
 The above characteristics will lead to considerable level of confusion among locals in 
how to identify themselves, and this might lead to considerable switching between 
different group memberships depending on the context of membership.  
6. Methodology and Data Collection. 
In order to meaningfully answer the research question, I sampled Hong Kong locals between 
age 21 and 29 years old. The rationale for delineating the population to this restricted age 
group was as follows: Locals born between the years of 1986 and 1994 spent their formative 
years in a post-handover Hong Kong, and they were among the first generation to do so. 
Primary data was collected through a series of semi-structured qualitative interviews with 
locals from Hong Kong. This means I prepared questions ahead of time, but still allowed a 
flexible dialog such that new inquiries could be made based on the direction of the 
conversation (Bryman, 2012: 213). Qualitative interviews extract more detailed information 
from its participants compared to standard surveys, allowing for a more in-depth analysis. 
Attention can also be put in regards to the participant’s tone of voice or body language. 
Finally, qualitative surveys on national sentiments in Hong Kong already exist. 
Despite my population delineation of the age group, in reality, no participant younger than 24 
(born after 1990) did partake in this study. Though an upper limit for participants was never 
decided, a total 17 people eventually did agree to be interviewed. Interviews were conducted 
between the time periods of February and March 2015. Interviews occurred both individually 
and in groups. Additionally, interviews were recorded using a recorder. Interviews was 
carried out in English since I personally lack proficiency in Cantonese. Though the general 
English ability of Hong Kong is relatively high, English proficiency correlates with 
educational level, making participants more likely to have university background. 
Furthermore, as both a Westerner and a foreigner myself, it is also possible that participants 
tailored their responses to meet some kind of expectation, or that they felt uncomfortable 
revealing personal opinions or views.  
Two willing informants were procured prior to conducting field research (personal 
acquaintances). Thereafter, acquiring additional participants relied on a snowball method. 
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Snowball sampling relies on the social networks of prior informants and is a convenient way 
of finding additional participants (Bryman, 2012: 424). However, due to its unsystematic 
nature, my sampling strategy might have introduced bias into the study results in a few ways. 
First, the sampling strategy clearly excludes people who lack English proficiency, even if they 
fit the demographic or target group. Second, snowball sampling is a non-random selection that 
makes further generalization problematic because not everyone in the population are likely to 
be picked for an interview. As a consequence, the study sample is not likely to be 
representative of the Hong Kong population (Bryman, 2012: 201-202).  
Due to these shortcomings, primary data is supplemented using secondary data acquired from 
the Public Opinion Program, University of Hong Kong, or "HKU POP Site". Secondary data 
is used to plot the longitudinal development on the sentiment of Hong Kong identity and 
compliments the personal interviews that will partially provide a view of how individual 
identities are negotiated.  
6.1 Ethical Considerations. 
The topic of national identity can indeed be a very sensitive or complex issue for many 
people. Moreover, the 2014 Hong Kong protest have likely intensified political tensions even 
more. While there is reason to expect a high level of enthusiasm for the opportunity to talk 
about this topic, the four ethical principles outlined by Bryman adequately highlighted the 
concerns that needed to be addressed before any fieldwork was conducted; (1) harm to 
participants, (2) informed consent, (3) invasion of privacy, and (4) deception (Bryman, 2012: 
135). 
Obviously, this study did not seek the harm of its participants or informants, neither during 
interviews nor as a result of it. Consequently, interviews (including transcriptions) will be 
kept confidential as well as the identity of any informants anonymous. The study also sought 
the consent of its participants before conducting any interviews, and informants was 
sufficiently informed on both the topic and what kinds of questions they could anticipate. 
Also, questions was formulated so as to be non-offensive. In regards to privacy, interviews 
could be performed at any location and time of the participants choosing - no need to invade 
private space. In most cases, a coffee shop did suffice; it was both casual and relaxed. 
Similarly, participants was under no obligation to respond to uncomfortable questions about 
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their private life. Lastly, this study involved no deception and was straightforward about its 
intent and purpose with every participant. 
7. Primary Data. 
A total of 17 informants (10 female, 7 male) participated in this study. The youngest 
informant was 24 years, while the oldest was 29.  
Gender Age Occupation 
Male 24 Student, English Major 
Male 24 Student 
Male 27 - 
Male 27 Waiter 
Male 28 - 
Male 28 Finance 
Male 29 Sales, Electronics 
Female 24 Student, Accounting 
Female 24 Student, Social Science 
Female 24 Sales 
Female 25 Accounting 
Female 25 Student, M.A. 
Female 25 - 
Female 27 
Consulting, 
Communications 
Female 27 - 
Female 28 Student, PhD Music 
Female 28 Store Manager 
 
The research area is how Hongkongers negotiate their national identity in the aftermath of the 
Umbrella Revolution. A number of questions on this topic were assembled for the participants 
prior to the interviews (please see appendix 1 for a complete list of interview questions), but 
the semi-structured format also allowed for ad hoc and follow-up questions depending on the 
direction of each interview.  
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7.1. Primary Data Findings 
1A: How often do you discuss politics? 
In the roster of interview questions was a few related to the political understanding of the 
participants, and if the Umbrella Revolution changed their individual relationship with 
politics. The rationale for including these questions was to gauge the participant’s level of 
political interest, and if political debates are all a meaningful in how they negotiate their 
social identities. 
All of the informants gave similar answers, stating that they rarely talk about politics with 
others and especially avoid it at the office or workplace. A lack of knowledge or interest was 
stated to be the reason by only a few of the participants. Instead, a more recurring response 
was a concern not to offend or make other people uncomfortable. Many added that they will 
only discuss politics with friends and family if they can guarantee that they already share a 
similar view. This became a reliable enough reply even after only a handful of interviews that 
question 1C (Do you think that having different political opinions is a cause for conflict?) was 
added to the basic roster of interview questions. 
One of the male (28) participants, when asked how often he talks about politics, gave the 
following response:  
“I would say maybe 20% of the time because I do feel this is 
ascribed as a sensitive topic. It gets people… you know, if you 
are in a different view of them, or have the opposite view of 
them, I do not, you know, want to press the wrong buttons, 
basically.”   
Another male (24) informant expressed his cautious attitude to talk about politics with his 
family as such: 
“Maybe some daily topics but not really deep information 
because my point of view may be different from my parents 
because we are different generations.” 
One female (28) participant contrasted Hong Kong with Taiwan and explained, in her view, 
the difference in how people from these places approach political discussions:  
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“In Taiwan, people tend to have discussion, to have even 
argument. But here, they don’t want to listen because they don’t 
know how to present their points to each other. Everything is 
more emotional instead of realistic facts. […] At my office, 
people will sometimes talk about things they read in the news 
but that’s about it.”  
A similar response by three other participants was that they seldom talk about politics because 
it rarely effects or involve them. If there is no noticeable impact on their personal quality of 
life, such as through censorship, the availability of jobs, or living costs, then a political 
discussion becomes unnecessary. One female (28) participants explained herself in the 
following manner:   
“If life is good, then we don’t have to worry about it. We don’t 
have that mindset of voicing our opinions. Politics are very 
tricky thing; you don’t know what others are thinking. Maybe 
you and your boss are in different camps, then it is a concern. 
So you rather say nothing than to go up against each other.” 
Finally, two informants stated they never participate in political discussions at home because 
they either don’t understand or simply have no interest. One female (27) said: 
“My mother has strong opinions about politics and she talks a 
lot about it at home. But I don’t listen or participate much 
because I don’t understand.” 
1B: Have the “Umbrella Revolution” made you think or talk more about politics? 
Only one participant was of the view that the Umbrella Revolution has made him talk less 
about politics. Two informants stated that the movement had no impact on how often they talk 
or think about politics. The remaining 14 participants agreed that the Umbrella Revolution 
have made them more talkative about politics, as well as about other social/political issues 
related to the revolution. Most also expressed support in favor of the Umbrella Revolution, 
while only one remained somewhat ambiguous. A few responses include: 
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Male (24): “Actually, this is a very big issue that made me and 
my parents discuss more than before because it is a 
breakthrough in Hong Kong for this kind of campaign. […] 
Previously maybe, my trust in them [the Hong Kong 
government] is quite high but after this kind of revolution, I 
think my trust is getting less because I think the transparency is 
getting worse between the government and the people.” 
Female (25): “We are fighting for universal suffrage; this is why 
we have ‘Umbrella Revolution’. “ 
Male (29): “People at my office talk about it every day.” 
Female (24): “We feel that that the Hong Kong-government 
does not support us, us citizens, they are with the Chinese 
government. But Hong Kong government should support us 
more.” 
The only response that voiced an opposition towards the ‘Umbrella Revolution’ was made by 
a male (28) who explained himself in the following way: 
“Actually, I start talking less because…  I am on the 
conservative side, so a lot of times when they [the protesters] 
are very collectively, you know, try to seek what they want, I 
may not 100% agree with it. […] I do not want to sound like I 
disrespect what they are doing but they don’t seem to 
understand where I’m coming from as well, so I try to avoid that 
kind of conflict with them, I guess.” 
In general, political awareness is on the rise since the Umbrella Revolution. Most participants 
came out in support of the Umbrella Movement, expressing distrust in both the local and 
central government. Political awareness give individuals an advantage in negotiation their 
political identity, and to orientate both Hong Kong and Chinese identity in relation to that. 
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1C: Do you think that having different political opinions is a cause for conflict? (Added later) 
This question was added after interviewing four people because of a consistent trend in the 
responses to question 1A. Most informants expressed the sentiment that having different 
outlooks on politics or on social issues will result in unfriendly arguments that can jeopardize 
friendships, and arguments therefore should preferably be avoided. A good relationship with 
friends and family was explained to be of high priority and should not be put at risk because 
of sensitive discussions. Several responses include: 
Male (24): “When I notice there is some conflict between me 
and my parents and they may get angry or sad, I will just stop 
the discussion.” 
Male (28): “Yes, it is a source of conflict.” 
Female (27): “I don’t want to get into argument with friends, so 
we avoid sensitive issues. I think having different opinions is a 
problem, so I prefer not to talk about it because I don’t want to 
make people upset.” 
Female (25): “Maybe among the collogues some of us will 
discuss. But if we have different kinds of opinion, maybe we will 
argue and so it is better not to chat about this topic among us. 
[…] In my family, my father side, my grandmother has four 
sons. Two is supporting the Umbrella Revolution, one does not 
support, and one is neutral. Everything is kind of weird and not 
very appropriate to talk about during family gatherings.” 
Female (24) “For me, only if I know that person has the same 
point of view as me, then we will discuss this topic. But 
otherwise, I prefer not to talk about it. Like, if we are friends or 
family, I do not want to have argument or stuff. Everyone can 
have their own point of view, that is okay, that is fine, but I also 
have mine and I don’t think we should have a discussion or 
argument about this.” 
33 
 
2: Does China feel like a foreign country to you? 
Most participants were of the opinion that China feels like a foreign country. However, they 
stated very different reasons for this experience. But one recurring argument was that the 
language is different, which was a concern voiced by six of the informants. Three participants 
said that people “behave” or “act” differently on the mainland, such as being ruder or talk 
differently. Other arguments include that the cultures are different, that China lags behind 
Hong Kong in terms of technology and development. Two informants expressed a negative 
view of Chinese mainlanders, saying that they interrupt or disturb the way of life in Hong 
Kong. A few of the responses include: 
Male (24): “I think it is totally different place.”  
Female (24): “I think we have different cultures. […] Sadly for 
China, it is still developing; it is not very developed country. 
Maybe fifty years ago, Hong Kong was this as well, but we are 
on different page for cultural development and society – we are 
on total different page.” 
Female (25): “Yes. […] The way they behave is different, like 
how they talk.” 
Female (25): “Yes because they are interrupting our lives. Like, 
all the shop in Mong Kok now turn to pharmacy, accessory-
shops, and all the price of the house is rising because they have 
money to invest in Hong Kong, and because the demand 
increase but the supply is the same – they interrupt our lives!” 
Male (29): “Yes, because I cannot speak Mandarin.”  
Female (27): “Yes, they have different behavior.” 
Female (28): “Yes, but they look at me as foreigners as well, so 
it is mutual, I think.” 
Only one participant said that China do not feel like a foreign place, or at least less than it 
used to do. He said: 
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Male (28): “Less than before because my family where 
immigrants from the mainland and I still have relatives leaving 
in mainland China”. 
Though participants gave imprecise explanations, the responses suggests a notion of 
mainlanders as an out-group. While this does not explicitly prohibit Hongkongers from also 
identifying with Chinese identity, it does make them less likely to internalize that identity, as 
explained by SIT. 
3: What do you know about Hong Kong history? 
Overall, participants admitted to either poor knowledge of the history of local history or low 
interest. While most could state the year of Hong Kong’s handover to China, as well as that 
Hong Kong used to be a British colony since the mid-1800s, several participants simply shock 
their head and gave no response at all. One participant explained this lack of knowledge due 
to a generational gap, his parents or grandparents used to have better knowledge about local 
history. Chinese history however is much more prevalent.  
Male (24): “Almost nothing. Maybe because of my age. My 
generation, we don’t know as much as our parents did. […] I 
know we returned to the Chinese government in 97.” 
Male (28): “A little bit but not too much. […] In school we 
usually cover Chinese plus world history, but not so much Hong 
Kong history.” 
Female (28): “Usually we read about Chinese history and then 
how we [Hong Kong] became a British Colony. But then there is 
almost nothing.”  
Historical memory is cited as important for the construction of collective identities by both 
the primordialist and constructivist school of thought. The lack of a historical memory as it 
pertains to Hong Kong specifically can be a contributing factor to the inconsistent meaning of 
“Chinesess”, and how Hong Kong identity relates to that national identity.  
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4A: Do you consider yourself part of an ethnic group? Which one? 
Participants gave varied responses but generally agreed that they are “Chinese” because of 
ancestry. However, most felt the need to emphasize that they are also from Hong Kong. Only 
one informant had a different view, saying that she is solely a “Hongkonger”. Two 
participants stated that, although they consider themselves Chinese or part of China, they 
don’t like being called such. Another two participants also explained that they understand, or 
are aware, that a lot of locals have mixed feelings about being called “Chinese” and usually 
like to preface themselves as being “from Hong Kong”. 
Female (25): “I’m still Chinese – yellow skin, black hair, black 
eyes.” 
Female (27): “I am Chinese.” 
Female (28): “If I meet new friends, I will say I am Chinese 
from Hong Kong.” 
Male (24): “I think in nature, I am really part of China. But 
actually, personally, I struggle with this identity […]. Maybe 
when I go to places, people will think that you are Chinese but I 
have to explain myself that I am from Hong Kong.”  
Female (24): “I was born in Hong Kong, so Hong Kong.” 
Male (29): “Some people are really strong on this […] they will 
get offended if you ask ‘are you from China?’” 
As an ethnical identity, Chineseness face less ambiguity among Hongkongers. However, 
responses was also accompanied by an apathetic attitude, implying little emotional 
commitment towards said ethnicity. Furthermore, territorial identity with Hong Kong was 
added for extra emphasis by several of the informants. 
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4B: What label would you prefer? – Ex. Chinese, Hongkonger, Hongkongnese, Hong Kong 
Chinese. 
Participants clearly preferred being called “Hongkonger” or “Hongkongnese” before other 
alternatives. However, most also said they didn’t mind being called “Chinese”, especially in 
the case of foreigners who may not know the difference. A few statements include: 
Male (28): “I don’t mind being called Chinese, but I mean… I 
guess both are fine. […] Because China is so big, right, like the 
states or something. I usually say I am Chinese, but I am from 
Hong Kong. Like maybe I want to differentiate myself a little bit 
by just pointing out where I am from. […] But I am happy to call 
myself Chinese. But if I had to choose, I would say Hong Kong 
Chinese. 
Male (24): “Hong Kong-people.” 
Female (24): “I prefer being called Hongkongnese.” 
Female (25): “If you ask me if I am ‘Chinese’, to that extent I 
am, but if you ask me where I come from I will say Hong Kong 
instead of China.” 
Female (25): “Hong Kong is not country, China is, so I would 
say Chinese from Hong Kong.” 
Participants put different empathic connotations on labels such as “Hongkonger” and 
“Chinese”, most showing a preference towards the former (or some variation). This does not 
prevent individuals from also identifying as Chinese, but individuals may feel it is an 
unnecessary descriptor.  
4C: In your view, can I become a “Hongkonger” if a take up residency and learn the local 
language? 
This question generated very oppositional responses in the sense that participants were 
divided equally in a “yes” or “no”-camp. Only one informant gave a separate ambiguous 
response in which she said the decision was up to me, though it can be taken as a kind of 
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“yes”. But eight participants affirmed they would gladly consider me a local “hongkonger” if 
I lived in Hong Kong long enough. However, the remaining eight informants stated that they 
would not consider me to be a “local” or, at best, only very loosely so if I also learned the 
language in a proficient enough manner. Some of the “yes” responses include: 
Male (24): “I think for me, I would consider you part of Hong 
Kong. […] I think, for me, Hong Kong is very multinational city 
already.” 
Female (24): “It seems you have to live here for seven years, but 
I would consider you “Hongkongnese.”  
Male (28): “Yeah, yeah. In general, I feel this city show a lot of 
appreciation when any foreigners speak our language. To be 
honest, if you speak one of the major languages here, then 
people do associate you much closer, like you are one of us.” 
Some participants from the “no”-camp explained themselves thusly: 
Female (25): “No, you are Westerner. I don’t even consider 
mainlanders who live here as ‘Hongkongnese’.” 
Female (25): “Not really. […] But if you learn to speak 
Cantonese, then maybe.” 
Male (29): “No, you will be an expat. Even if you get your 
permanent residency, you will still be considered an expat.” 
The final, ambiguous response was expressed in the following manner: 
Female (25): “It all depends on you, on your feelings.” 
Reponses reveal an inconsistent view on how to conceptualize Hong Kong identity as either 
an ethnic or civic notion. This inconsistency suggests that Hongkongers likely struggle how to 
negotiate between Hong Kong and Chinese identity.   
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5: For the purpose of governance, do you think it is a problem that they speak different 
languages in Hong Kong and Beijing? 
Participants had mixed reactions, while several also preferred not to answer. Different 
languages were stated as a “potential” issue for miscommunication, but otherwise not overly 
detrimental. Mandarin was said to be growing in use across Hong Kong but if they could have 
their individual way, they would prefer a single language for China – Cantonese. Some of the 
more interesting responses from the interviews include: 
Male (24): “Because I live here, I prefer Hong Kong-style. […] 
I prefer my original language.” 
Female (25): “I prefer using Cantonese, but more and more 
people are using Mandarin.”  
Male (28): “It is, it is a problem because… like I value language 
a lot. I always try to speak the same language as the person I 
talk too. […] It’s like a sense bonding, you know. So if our 
central government and we speak different language, it’s 
definitely going to cause… I wouldn’t say problem, but maybe 
lack if communications at times.” 
Female (25): “I can see how different languages can be a 
problem sometimes because people can misinterpret, but I think 
it still works out fine. If I could decide, Beijing would speaking 
more Cantonese instead of we [Hong Kong] speak Mandarin 
but I don’t really mind, and I don’t think most Hong Kong-
people mind either.”  
As implied by Anderson’s concept of print-capitalism, a national language was foundational 
for the emergence of a cohesive national identity in European countries. Mandarin however is 
yet to conquer all of China, as Cantonese is more commonly spoken in Hong Kong and other 
neighboring regions in the south (though Mandarin is growing in usage). Linguistic barriers 
makes the formation of a cohesive national identity less likely to reach all segments of the 
nation. Differences in spoken languages can also be a contributor towards in-group/out-group 
differentiation. 
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6: In your opinion, what would you like to see happen to Hong Kong in the future? What kind 
of development would you like to see? 
Given the opportunity to freely express their personal thoughts and wishes for the future of 
Hong Kong, a great deal of support (as anticipated) was voiced for greater independence, 
democracy, freedom, and civil liberties. Greater integration with China was not a recurring 
argument, stated only by one participant, and then only under the condition that Hong Kong 
still maintains relative freedom. Some of the informants expressed themselves in the 
following way: 
Male (24): “Of course, maybe we could vote for Chief Executive 
ourselves. […] More freedom, more freedom, because we are 
getting desperate right now. Hong Kong, previously, we are 
famous for freedom of speech, freedom of journalism, like 
people can say what they want in the press, and everything.”  
Female (24): “I would not like it [Hong Kong] to be a 
communist-place; that is the basic thing I would like to say.” 
Female (25): “Maybe China will take after Hong Kong, and I 
hope they will do this more and more.” 
Male (28): “To be very honest, to me, I would think that Hong 
Kong would cooperate with China more. […] We pretty much 
have no industry but finance, right, so if we are not being seen 
as the financial center of entire China…. once another city, like 
maybe Shanghai, overtakes us, then it will make our lives much 
harder. So, I would like to see Hong Kong cooperate more with 
China. […] But I would also like Hong Kong to remain 
independent as it is right now; I think that would be best for 
finance.” 
Male (29): “I would like to see One Country, One System – 
Hong Kong system.” 
Female (25): “I want real democracy.” 
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Female (27): “More independence.” 
Democratic values makes for essential components of the participants, which put them in 
stark contrast with the politics of Beijing. This political conflict lay at the heart of the 
Umbrella Revolution. As a political marker, Chinese identity therefore becomes a sensitive 
issue on a personal level.  
7.2. Secondary Data 
There is no shortage on quantitative surveys that aim to capture people’s ethnic and national 
sentiments in Hong Kong. In fact, surveys are being made repeatedly by several local 
universities. This section aims to supplement the primary data, and place my qualitative 
interviews within a larger, quantitative context. 
This survey comes from the University of Hong Kong, who conducts a public surveys twice a 
year (four or more times a year before 2003). The datasheet comes from the Public Opinion 
Centre, "POP Poll", and the indicator is identification as Chinese or Hongkonger. This survey 
goes back to 1997 (the year as the handover) up till 2014 (the latest). The original table can be 
found at their website.5 The biggest fault of the available secondary data is that it includes no 
age disparity, meaning that it is reflective of a much wider demographic as opposed to the one 
outlined in the research question of this thesis. In addition, unlike my hypotheses that 
hypothesize the multiplicity of national identities of Hong Kongers, this survey assumes a 
pre-fixed local vs. Mainlander identity, making it difficult for individuals to identify as both 
or neither. 
                                                          
5 Public Opinion Centre "POP Poll", The University of Hong Kong (accessed on 4th of January 2015), 
<http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/datatables.html> 
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  10-16/12/2014  1016   660   42.3%   24.3%   15.0%   17.8%   39.3%   0.6%   0.0%  
  6-12/6/2014  1026   660    40.2%   27.1%   11.6%   19.5%   38.7%   0.2%   1.3%  
  9-12/12/2013  1015   628    34.8%   27.6%   15.0%   21.8%   42.6%   0.8%   0.1%  
  10-13/6/2013  1055   677    38.2%   24.3%   12.0%   23.0%   36.3%   1.1%   1.6%  
  14-17/12/2012  1019   687    27.2%   33.1%   16.1%   21.3%   49.2%   0.6%   1.7%  
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  13-20/6/2012  1001   560    45.6%   22.8%   11.5%   18.3%   34.3%   1.1%   0.7%  
  12-20/12/2011  1016   541    37.7%   25.3%   17.8%   16.6%   43.1%   0.6%   2.1%  
  21-22/6/2011  520   520    43.8%   21.3%   10.3%   23.5%   31.7%   0.4%   0.6%  
  13-16/12/2010  1013   1013    35.5%   27.6%   13.8%   21.1%   41.4%   0.4%   1.5%  
  9-13/6/2010  1004   1004    25.3%   31.3%   14.8%   27.8%   46.0%   0.4%   0.5%  
  8-11/12/2009  1007   1007    37.6%   23.9%   13.1%   24.2%   37.0%   0.2%   1.0%  
  8-13/6/2009  1002   1002    24.7%   32.0%   13.3%   29.3%   45.3%   0.2%   0.4%  
  9-12/12/2008  1016   1016    21.8%   29.6%   13.0%   34.4%   42.6%   0.5%   0.7%  
  11-13/6/2008  1012   1012    18.1%   29.2%   13.3%   38.6%   42.5%   0.1%   0.7%  
  11-14/12/2007  1011   1011    23.5%   31.5%   16.0%   27.2%   47.5%   0.7%   1.1%  
  8-12/6/2007  1016   1016    23.4%   31.8%   16.7%   26.4%   48.5%   0.3%   1.4%  
  6-12/12/2006  1011   1011    22.4%   24.3%   20.1%   31.8%   44.4%   0.6%   0.7%  
  13-15/6/2006  1018   1018    24.8%   25.1%   14.9%   34.6%   40.0%   0.3%   0.3%  
  9-14/12/2005  1017   1017    24.8%   26.5%   16.9%   30.7%   43.4%   0.0%   1.1%  
  6-8/6/2005  1029   1029    24.0%   21.2%   14.7%   36.4%   35.9%   0.5%   3.3%  
  6-9/12/2004  1007   1007    25.9%   23.1%   16.2%   31.6%   39.3%   0.4%   2.8%  
  7-11/6/2004  1027   1027    28.0%   21.2%   14.3%   33.0%   35.5%   0.4%   3.1%  
  10-14/12/2003  1059   1059    24.9%   23.4%   15.6%   32.5%   39.0%   0.3%   3.3%  
  1-4/3/2003  1035   1035    28.5%   22.3%   15.0%   32.3%   37.3%   0.3%   1.6%  
  13-18/12/2002  1026   1026    31.1%   21.3%   14.3%   29.7%   35.6%   0.6%   3.0%  
  2-5/9/2002  1017   1017    28.9%   22.0%   15.0%   32.5%   37.0%   0.4%   1.2%  
  4-5/6/2002  1067   1067    32.2%   18.1%   13.0%   32.5%   31.1%   0.4%   3.9%  
  12-13/3/2002  1024   1024    27.5%   23.3%   17.9%   28.3%   41.2%   0.0%   3.0%  
  7-9/12/2001  1052   1052    31.9%   20.5%   10.4%   31.5%   30.9%   0.3%   5.4%  
  13-21/9/2001  1025   1025    26.1%   27.9%   17.6%   25.8%   45.5%   0.4%   2.1%  
  1-5/6/2001  1053   1053    36.1%   18.3%   13.3%   28.4%   31.6%   0.0%   3.8%  
  22/3-2/4/2001  1014   1014    31.4%   21.7%   16.0%   28.2%   37.7%   0.4%   2.3%  
  4-12/12/2000  1040   1040    35.6%   19.1%   13.8%   25.2%   32.9%   0.9%   5.5%  
  21-25/9/2000  1087   1087    37.0%   26.8%   14.5%   17.4%   41.3%   0.4%   3.9%  
  7-8/6/2000  1074   1074    35.5%   22.9%   14.0%   22.8%   36.9%   0.7%   4.1%  
  6-7/4/2000  570   570    38.7%   21.4%   14.2%   20.4%   35.6%   0.2%   5.1%  
  1-2/2/2000  566   566    38.3%   23.2%   19.5%   13.8%   42.7%   0.5%   4.6%  
  13-15/12/1999  529   529    39.0%   20.9%   17.2%   19.9%   38.1%   0.2%   2.8%  
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The percentage of locals who favor “Chinese” as their descriptor peaked in 2008 (38.6%), but 
saw a noticeable downward trend afterwards, while the term “Hongkonger” saw an upward 
trend during the same period, with an result of above 40% in 2014. “Chinese in Hong Kong” 
is arguably the least popular choice overall.  
7.3. Analysis Summary. 
This thesis finds evidence for individual struggle for identity but in ways that also manifest 
the lack of concrete definition of the national identity of the Hong Kong people. The 
vagueness in the meaning of “Chinese-ness” leads to contradictions in how individuals talk 
about their identities. The contradictions are expressed (1) between the notion as an ethnic 
marker versus a territorial identity that is based on affiliations with the mainland (a distinction 
which becomes salient in the course of contact with mainlanders), and (2) in the argument that 
“Chineseness” is both primordial and historically-based yet also politically constructed. This 
provides support to the idea that identities are situationally constructed but also multiple.  
Date of survey 
 樣本
人數 
Total 
Sample
  
 次樣本
人數 
Sub-
sample  
 香港人 
Hongkon
ger  
 中國的香
港人 
Hongkong
er in 
China  
 香港的中
國人 
Chinese in 
Hong 
Kong  
 中國人 
Chinese  
 混合
身分 
Mixed 
Identity
  
 其他 
(請列
明) 
Other  
 唔知/
難講 
DK/HS
  
  26-27/10/1999  535   535    31.2%   23.7%   16.2%   25.5%   39.9%   0.7%   2.6%  
  6/8/1999  596   596    30.3%   23.3%   17.5%   25.3%   40.8%   0.3%   3.2%  
  8/6/1999  538   538    39.9%   25.0%   11.2%   17.0%   36.2%   0.6%   6.3%  
  15/4/1999  527   527    43.4%   20.0%   13.1%   18.0%   33.1%   0.4%   5.1%  
  8-9/2/1999  513   513    41.0%   20.9%   15.3%   17.6%   36.2%   1.2%   3.9%  
  21/12/1998  544   544    40.7%   22.3%   15.1%   17.2%   37.4%   0.6%   4.2%  
  29/9/1998  517   517    39.4%   22.9%   15.5%   20.6%   38.4%   0.4%   1.2%  
  14/8/1998  526   526    29.7%   25.2%   19.6%   22.0%   44.8%   0.2%   3.2%  
  22-24/6/1998  1042   1042    30.2%   18.0%   16.1%   31.6%   34.1%   0.4%   3.8%  
  3-4/6/1998  544   544    34.2%   18.6%   18.7%   24.8%   37.3%   0.2%   3.4%  
  8-9/12/1997  500   500    35.8%   22.9%   18.9%   18.2%   41.8%   0.2%   3.9%  
  28-29/10/1997  536   536    36.6%   22.6%   20.1%   17.5%   42.7%   0.2%   3.0%  
  23-24/9/1997  512   512    36.2%   24.2%   20.3%   17.5%   44.5%   0.2%   1.6%  
  26-27/8/1997  532   532    34.9%   24.8%   20.1%   18.6%   44.9%   0.4%   1.3%  
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While being Chinese is not incompatible with Hong Kong identity, many hold “Chinese-ness” 
as having little practical value as a national marker. Though many embrace “Chinese” as an 
ethnical identity, nationalist sentiments are lacking. Little agreement is also shown in regards 
to the political philosophy of the Chinese Central Government, and personal desires instead 
stray towards a politically independent and democratic Hong Kong. Language differences in 
Beijing and Hong Kong also make the formation of a cohesive national identity more 
difficult. 
8. Conclusions / Final Reflection. 
Hong Kong is a complex case and this study reflects only the thoughts and experiences of one 
particular group of the local population. China and Hong Kong are geographical realities, with 
clear objective borders, and it is therefore a trivial task to divide people as living in distinct 
political regions. But identity is a fluid thing, much more difficult to divide in a similar 
fashion. Then again, identity is also malleable to local circumstances and given the imprint of 
Hong Kong’s colonial and migratory history, it is perhaps an easy conclusion to make that 
Hong Kong identity is both unique and distinct from mainland China. Cultural identities, 
including nationality, are important for people’s self-representation; they are a source for 
meaning, history, and values. However, Hong Kong is a place with limited exposure to 
Chinese nationalism. Arguably, the issue of "nationality" is even a relative newcomer into the 
mental life of many young Hongkongers. Similarly, the meaning of "Chinese-ness" is also 
vague and often contradictive.  
The goal of this thesis was to answer three questions regarding the issue of national identity in 
Hong Kong:  
 How has the Umbrella revolution affected Hong Kong identity? 
 How do Hong Kong people understand "Chineseness" in the aftermath of the 
Umbrella Revolution? 
 How is the notion of “Chinese-ness” understood, and is it understood as being in 
contradiction to “Hong Kong identity”? 
The Umbrella Revolution as left a clear mark in the political consciousness of Hongkongers, 
and made Hong Kong identity more confrontational to Chinese nationality as a political 
marker. On a personal level, Hongkongers put less emotional attachment to China than they 
do Hong Kong, being generally critical to Chinese nationalism. Meanwhile, they express 
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commitment to the fate of Hong Kong in so far as there is a support (though there is cynicism 
as well) to the Umbrella Movement and the democratic future of Hong Kong. Consequently, 
many favor, for example, being called “Hongkonger” or “Hongkongnese” above other 
designates. A few participants outright say they do not identify themselves as “Chinese”. 
However, most are still willing to consider themselves Chinese as a matter of nationality and 
as acknowledgement of ethnical roots. When used in this context, Chineseness face less 
friction as an identity. However, the meaning of “Chineseness” is unclear, having both 
primordial and civic connotations.  
The salience of in-group and out-group distinctions between Chinese and Hongkongers are 
noticeable in their accounts of interactions with mainlanders. A select few even consider 
mainlanders a disrupting element. Several informants also think that mainland China feels like 
a different or foreign place to visit, chiefly because of different behavior and languages. 
Admittedly, a missed opportunity of this study was that no particular inquiry was made into 
the media habits and media consumption of the sample group. Such a thing could reveal more 
about how individuals both navigate and negotiate Hong Kong and Chinese identity. 
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Appendix 1. Interview Questions. 
1A: How often do you discuss politics? 
1B: Have the “Umbrella Revolution” made you think or talk more about politics? 
1C: Do you think that having different political opinions is a cause for conflict? (Added later) 
2: Does China feel like a foreign country to you? 
3: What do you know about Hong Kong-history? 
4A: Do you consider yourself part of an ethnic group? Which one? 
4B: What label would you prefer? – Ex. Chinese, Hongkonger, Hongkongnese, Hong Kong 
Chinese. 
4C: In your view, can I become a “Hongkonger” if a take up residency and learn the local 
language? 
5: For the purpose of governance, do you think it is a problem that they speak different 
languages in Hong Kong and Beijing? 
6: In your opinion, what would you like to see happen to Hong Kong in the future? What kind 
of development would you like to see? 
 
